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Loving Cultural Heritage
Private individual giving and prosocial behavior
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyse patterns of private individual giving to Cultural
Heritage institutions in Italy. Based on the emerging economic literature on pro-social
behavior, we carried out a Contingent Valuation survey to assess individuals’ willingness
to donate to museums and heritage organizations according to different conditions and set
of incentives. Our findings reveal that intrinsic motivations and accountability of the
recipient institutions may be more effective drivers for eliciting charitable giving than the
usually proposed fiscal incentives. The results provide avenues for future empirical
research and policy suggestions for fund raising cultural institutions.
JEL Codes: D11, D12, H4, Z1
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyse the motivations behind individual giving for cultural
heritage. Even if donations for culture generally rank low in the priorities of donors,
they represent a crucial funding source in a context of general decrease of availability
of resources to arts and culture. Hence, from a policy viewpoint, it becomes essential to
find out the incentives and contexts that stimulate private giving.
Yet, in the last decades the cultural policy agenda has mainly focused on tax policy.
Lowering the price of giving follows a rational economic logic that assumes a negative
relation between the monetary cost of giving and the supply of charitable acts by
individuals.
However, even economists have begun in the last decades to recognize and study the
determinants of prosocial behavior other than the pure monetary and price incentives
(i.e. Titmuss, 1974; Andreoni, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Frey, 1997; Frey and
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Pro-social motivations, such as
altruism, moral codes of conduct and civic responsibility, may represent driving forces
for engaging in the voluntarily contribution of collective goods. At the same time,
1
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reputational concerns may substitute monetary incentives with social forms of
compensation and equally generate virtous dynamics in prosocial behavior. These
findings, have so far found little reflex in the cultural policy debate.
In this paper we focus on the demand side of charitable giving in order to provide a
more comprehensive framework of the determinants of private donations to cultural
heritage and to assess their implications for cultural policy. We argue that in order to
tailor more effective fundraising strategies for cultural heritage we need to address
intrinsic, extrinsic and reputational motivations. Based on this broader approach, we
present the results of a recent contingent valuation survey carried out on a sample of
Italian population to provide empirical evidence of voluntary donations and to
investigate factors and conditions influencing individual giving to preserve cultural
heritage.
It is finally worth to notice that individual giving for charity is both a universal value
driven by ethics and moral rules, and a phenomenon influenced by local culture and
institutional factors. This means that every theory of giving must contain general
explanations and take account of local cultural conditions. In this sense, the exploration
of the Italian case is a contribution both to the general theory and to the influence of
local contexts.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 shows the main limitis of private
individual donations as a funding strategy for arts and culture; Section 3 describes the
general model of private donations; Section 4 gives details on the survey design and
implementation; Section 5 discusses the main results while Section 6 concludes with
policy recommendations.

2. Individual giving to cultural heritage: residual
choice, misplaced emphasis
Charitable giving to cultural heritage seems to suffer from two main drawbacks. The first
one relates to the limited appeal of cultural heritage for attracting donations as compared
to other sectors. The second is a misplaced emphasis in cultural policy, whereby
introducing tax incentives seems to be the preferred mechanism of policymakers in
search for easy fundraising and popularity.
Among the different recipient sectors, private support to arts, culture and cultural heritage
organizations ranks low in the amount of charitable donations. According to some rough
estimate, internationally perhaps 10% of private philanthropy flows to culture (Inkei,
2001). In United States, in 2007 out of 307 billion dollars, only 4,8% of the total amount
has been directed to organizations in arts, culture and humanities (Giving Usa
Foundation, 2008). In a similar vein, in Italy out of 5,5 billions euro of charitable giving
estimated in 20071, arts and culture organizations ranks equally low as a recipient sector.
For instance, recent surveys on donors’ behavior in Italy2 reveal that the share of
donations directed to arts, culture and cultural heritage institutions range between 1 to
3,2%.
1

Il Sole 24ore, 24 dicembre 2007
See i.e. Tomorrow SWG, Il monitor delle donazioni, Milano, maggio 2007; Doxa,
Comportamenti di donazione degli italiani, Roma, ottobre 2006
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Donating for culture seems therefore a residual choice, coming behind other sectors such
as religious organizations, health, education or human services. In the competitive market
for charitable giving potential donors’ preferences are likely to be directed towards
sectors for basic needs fulfillment rather than to the production of collective goods like
arts and cultural heritage preservation. For instance, people may have more direct
experience of health disease or feel a stronger personal sense of belonging to religious
values.
Moreover, it seems there has usually been a misplaced emphasis on fiscal incentives,
which in contrast have failed in matching the set of unobservable priorities of potential
donors in cultural activities. As noted by Schuster (2006), the main approach in the
cultural policy agenda has centered in tax incentives to donors, as a measure to lower the
price of giving and thus stimulate the voluntarily contribution of resources to the
collective good. However, so far there has not been clear evidence that tax exemptionbased support policy has induced private donations to culture. First, the economic effect
of tax incentives on donations is dubious, as some empirical studies show that giving is
moderately price elastic while others inelastic (Steinberg, 2003). Second, from a policymaking viewpoint, there is concern that the induced private contribution by fiscal
incentive is far less than the foregone tax (Feld et. al., 1983). This is mainly because part
of the total contribution provided under the tax incentives scheme would have been
donated even without any fiscal support policy.
Both the residual choice of donors and the misplaced emphasis in fiscal policies for
donations ask for a reassessment of the analysis of individual motivations and
institutional incentives that drive donors’ behavior. For the sake of our analysis we focus
on Italy, because it is an appropriate example where donations to cultural heritage
represent a residual choice and are affected by a misplaced emphasis in tax incentives as
a way to stimulate them.
The country is very rich of museums and heritage sites (more than 3500). Most of them
are public institutions and the system is higly centralized leaving a modest financial
autonomy to public museums. Further, public funds, both at the local and state level, are
limited. Fundraising activity attracting donors is not fully developed, except for a tax
rebate of 19% for the private contribution either to the acquisition, preservation and
restoration of artworks and buildings or for the organization of art exhibitions.
However, this fiscal scheme seems to not attract many contributors. For instance, the total
collected funds in 2008 accounted for 20 millions Euros and only about 1% or 2% of
donations trough this mechanism comes from individual giving3.
At the same time, voluntarily contributions in donation boxes at the entrance of museums
are not implemented; neither membership nor other auxiliary services are fully used for
collecting funds. Given the almost complete lack of individual giving to cultural heritage
and the underdeveloped fundraising mechanisms, it is therefore interestenting to explore
how novel fundraising strategies may be implemented starting from the potential donors’
needs and motivations.

3
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3. Motivations for giving to Cultural Heritage
The preservation and valorization of cultural heritage is commonly seen as a public good
and therefore private donations to cultural heritage represent a form of pro-social
behavior to achieve that goal. Following the current literature on donations and
philantropy (Andreoni, 2008; Bekkers and Wiepking, 2007; Benabou and Tirole, 2006;
Vesterlund, 2006), we adopt a framework where agents’ pro-social behavior reflects an
endogenous mix of motivations, which must be inferred from their choices and the
context.
Intrinsic Motivations
Intrinsic motivations are those arising from within the person. According to Deci (1975),
a performed activity is driven by intrinsic motivations when one receives no apparent
reward except the activity itself. Social psychologists and scientists have long recognized
that joy of giving, moral codes of conduct and civicness may be driving forces for
engaging in prosocial behavior such as the voluntarily contribution to collective goods
(Batson 1998; Mansbridge, 1998). By contrast, standard economic theory has found more
puzzling and challenging to understand why in many circumstances people act
unselfishly without engaging in free riding behavior.
Since 1970, Richard Titmuss (1970) showed that in specific transactions, namely blood
donations, individual’s sense of civic duty is more effective than monetary rewards in
providing higher blood quality and better supply. Albeit highly debated, this seminal
insight provided one of the first contributions for introducing intrinsic motivations within
the standard economic framework of human behavior.
From an economic viewpoint, there can be three main possibilities to address the
complex psychological process defining intrinsic motivation in private giving (Andreoni,
1988). First, agents may care in a pure altruistic way about the overall level of public
good to which their actions contribute. In this familiar public good provision model,
intrinsic motivations reflect the individual willingness to contribute according to the
preferences for the public good. A second possibility to frame intrinsic motivations is
considering forms of impure altruism. For instance, agents may obtain some internal
satisfaction – a “warm glow” - from the act of giving, in addition to what they care about
the overall level of public good (Andreoni, 1990). Third, intrinsic motivations may also
be taken into account by assuming moral constraints, ethical codes and principles of
reciprocity or interdependent preferences of individuals (Sugden, 1984).
Looking at individual donations to cultural heritage, a mix of the three explanations can
be assumed to be the main source of intrinsic motivation. In summary, we expect the
willingness to donate to cultural heritage is positively related to:
-

the past cultural heritage consumption, whose addiction effect lowers the cost of
accessing culture; the more the consumption, the highest are the direct benefits
deriving from contributing to the preservation of cultural heritage;

-

the willingness to enhance the existence and option values of cultural heritage at
the advantage of both present and future generations;

-

the extent an individual is affected by warm glow effect, which may be positively
related to past experience of donations, as the experience of moral satisfaction in
the past may induce people to replicate new acts of giving;
4
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-

the sense of civicness and belonging to a community; the more an individual is
embedded in a community that historically have practiced charitable giving the
more may be willing to donate as a form of indirect gift and reciprocity.

Extrinsic Motivations
Extrinsic motivations refer to the set of economic incentives and conditions coming from
outside the person. Individuals’ rational decision is in fact based on a cost-benefit
assessment of their engagement in pro-social activity.
The main class of extrinsic motivation is made of monetary rewards and other forms of
economic incentives, such as tax rebates. The basic idea is that such forms of economic
compensation lower the opportunity cost of engaging in prosocial behavior and thus
increase the overall supply of contributions to cultural heritage.
This argument follows the basic and strong assumption that extrinsic and intrinsic
motivations are independent and usually the formers reinforce the latter in acting
prosocially. For this reason, the additional monetary compensation and tax rebate proposed
by the policy makers are commonly assumed to increase the supply of donations.
Yet it is necessary to understand which is the optimal level of monetary compensation that
will make extrinsic incentives work. For instance, if individuals perceive a tax rebate too
small, the opportunity cost of contributing still outweighs the sum of monetary rewards and
potential benefits expected from the public good. In this case, the economic incentive is
uneffective.
Moreover, scholars have also reported in some circumstances phenomena of motivational
crowding out, whereby extrinsic incentives, such as monetary compensation and rewards,
may crowd out spontaneous prosocial acts, lowering the overall amount of contribution.
For istance, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) report a field experiment where direct
monetary compensation by the government reduced people’s acceptance of a noxius
facility. The main explanation for this phenomenon is that monetary compensation
generated a sort of bribe effect and crowded out the intrinsic sense of civic duty among
citizens.
In our knowledge, motivational crowding out of intrinsic motivations to donate by
monetary compensation has never been documented in charitable giving and this possibility
has still to be tested trough empirical evidence.
Reputational Motivations
Reputational motivations stem from the search for social recognition. In general, for
cultural and historical reasons, giving to charitable organizations is viewed as a positive
act in many societies. Therefore, beyond intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, donations
may be driven by reputational concerns. For instance, Glazer and Konrad (1996) stress
this point by presenting a model where the main driver for monetary giving is social
signaling of status, such that donations by rich people substitute in specific cases the
conspicuous comsumption of luxury private goods.
In more general terms, reputational concerns for giving do not only raise for signaling
social and wealth status, but simply for obtaining public praise, pursuit of distinction and
image rewards. These factors depend more on social pressure and norms (Benabou and
Tirole, 2006).

5
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Because acquiring reputation trough giving follows a social signaling motive, this
behavior is ultimately affected by the visibility of the act. If the donation is anonymous or
not easy to detect, then it is hard to gain reputation. As a consequence, anonymous
donations are those considered the most valuable. Arguably, it is for this reason that
charitable and non-profit institutions make ample use of donors’ desire to demonstrate
their generosity and selflessness, with displays ranging from lapel pins and T-shirts to
plaques in opera houses or museums and buildings named after large contributors.
Furthermore, even if there exist mechanisms of visibility, reputational concerns work
better if potential donors expect their action is visible by a clearly defined reference peer
group. For instance, Glazer and Konrad (1996) report that the high level of non
anonymous contributions to American universities made by alumni may also be caused
by the desire to signal one’s status and obtain public praise by the group of former
classmates.
In the context of giving to cultural heritage and museums, affluent donors may be
motivated to give in order to signal their own social status if mechanisms of publicity and
visibility are available. However, it is not clear in this context if image motivation and the
quest for public praise have an effect on medium and small contributors. Indeed, being
enlisted in a public list of donors or similar mechanisms of ex-post publicity might not
represent a sufficient social reward.

4. Survey design and implementation
There is a growing empirical literature on patterns of charitable giving. From a
methodological viewpoint, it is possibile to group empirical studies in three categories at
least. In the first category there are studies which use data set of actual and past donations
to charities in order to assess the determinants of private giving (Smith et al., 1995;
Buraschi and Cornelli, 2002). In the second category there are studies which use
laboratory and field experiments to test how people react in their giving practices
according to different set of incentives and contexts, with a special emphasis on the
effects of matching gifts on charitable giving (Karlan and List, 2007; Rondeau and List,
2006; Landry et al., 2006). Finally, in the third category there are studies that employ
contingent valuation survey to estimate donation, and investigate motives and attitudes
behind this behavior (Santagata and Signorello, 2000; Thompson et al., 2002).
In this paper we use contingent valuation for our empirical analysis. The main reason for
analysing hypotetical donations instead of examine real donation data in Italy is due, as
noted before, to the limited number of individual donations to cultural heritage.
Contingent valuation surveys based on charitable donation might be not full demand
revealing due to potential free-riding, and might run the risk of “hypothetical bias”.
However, as Champ et al. (1997), and Champ and Bishop (2001) argued, donation
vehicles are potentially more useful than is commonly recognized, especially in the field
of cultural heritage. In fact, donation mechanisms offer practical advantages that may
outweigh the drawback of potential free-riding: first, they can estimate an empirically
testable lower bound on Hicksian surplus; second, they may be less subject to vehicle
bias; third, donation mechanisms are more credible and more familiar than other
mechanisms, as individuals normally have experience in donations; finally, as noted by
Kahneman and Knetsch (1992), when in surveys individuals are asked for the willingness
to pay, their responses include the purchase of moral satisfaction for contributing to
6
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public goods. The latter is known as a bias in the measurement of the willingness to pay
through contingent valuation, but in the case of analyzing donations it is in line with prosocial behavior based in intrinsic motivation.
In order to collect the data a Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) was
implemented. Data collection took place from April to May 2009 by a specialized polling
and market research company. A probabilistic stratified sample of 1000 individuals over
25 who have visited at least one museum during the preceding 12 months was selected
from telephone directories. The sample is representative of the Italian population of
visitors to museums or heritage sites according to sex, age and geographic area.
The questionnaire was designed following best practice guidelines, and comprised of
three parts. The first part started by asking individual to choose within a list one museum
or heritage site that she/he considers representative of the Italian cultural heritage in
her/his local area. This variation across individuals in the good to be valued (or receiving
donations) is the most signicant feature of our application respect to the common
contingent valuation studies where only a good is valued.
The first question was followed by a series of questions regarding individual experience
on donations. The second part of the questionnaire included the contingent valuation
scenarios and questions eliciting donations for each depicted scenario. In order to assess
the role of different incentives for the donation to cultural heritage and museums, we
constructed a simple framework articulated into two phases, as shown in Figure 1. In the
first phase, respondents were asked to state their willingness to donate for selected
cultural heritage institution in a neutral scenario. This would be considered as a form of
pure prosocial behavior without any additional incentive. The answer to this question
represent the baseline case for testing the effectiveness of additional incentives and
contexts linked to the opportunity of giving. In the second phase, the individuals are
asked if they would modify their stated amount facing three new independent scenarios,
namely a) fiscal incentives (tax rebates), b) reputational incentives and c) transparency of
the destination and efficient use of the funds donated. The same question is posed to
those not willing to donate in the first phase in order to test if they are positively attracted
by the changed conditions. All the questions concerning the three scenarios were
randomized in each interview in order to avoid question order bias effects among the new
scenarios.
As far as tax incentives are concerned, the standard fiscal scheme has been proposed.
Actually, in Italy, the law allows tax rebates for individual charitable donations at a level
of 19% of the amount donated. It is important to notice that, because of the very scarce
number of individual donors to cultural heritage applying for this tax rebate, we assume
that this proposed scenario represents a completely new context at the respondents’ eyes
as compared to the baseline neutral scenario.
In our experimental setting, we proposed an additional scenario with 50% of fiscal
incentives in order to control for consistent economic behavior of respondents.

7
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Figure 1 – Questionnaire Framework

For the scenario of reputational incentives, recipient institutions would publicize
donations trough mechanism of social signaling and visibility according to the amount
given (a public list of donors, placing donors recognition plaques).
Finally, the last scenario refers to the accountability in the management and destinations
of the donations, such that donors would receive clear and detailed information about
how and for which projects their money would be used.
The repondents willingness to donate a lump sum for preserving and improving their
selected heritage good was elicited using the interval open-ended format, recently
proposed by Håkansson (2008). In the interval open-ended elicitation format, respondents
state their willingness to donate in the form of an interval rather than a point estimate as
in traditional open–ended format. In this way, it is possible to capture potential donation
uncertainty, more information about individuals’ preferences, and identify upper and
lower boundary of estimates.
Further, respondents were asked a series of follow up questions to identify the motives
for donating or not to the good they choose and to inquire about preferred modes of
donation.
The third part of the questionnaire concluded with standard socio-economic questions4.

4

Questions on gender and age were posed at the beginning of the interview in order to
fit sampling criteria.
8
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Table 1 - Description and value of the sample socio-economic variables
Variables

Description

Sex

Male=1 Female=0

Age
North
Centre
Education
Job
Visits
PastDonation
Numpastdon
DonCulture
Heritage
Importance
Visits
Voluntary
Organization
ValuePastDon

Categorical Variable:1(25-44
years), 2(45-64), 3 (65+)
Residents in North Italy=1
Other=0
Residents in Centre Italy=1
Other=0
Years of education
Employed=1 Other=0
Number of Visits to Museums
and Heritage sites in the last 12
months
Having donated in the past 3
years Yes=1 No =0
Number of donations in the past
three years
Having donated to Arts and
Culture Institutions=1 Other=0
Importance of Cultural Heritage
conservation for the respondent
1=low to 3= high
Number of visits to museums in
the past 12 months
Belonging to Voluntary
Organizations Yes=1 No=0
Highest amount donated in the
past 3 years (stated by the
respondent)

Mean

S.D.

0,43

0,495

1,89

0,706

0,46

0,499

0,2

0,4

14,04

3,352

0,58

0,494

3,03

1,625

0,77

0,422

2,84

1,91

0,04

0,205

2,85

0,369

3,03

1,625

0,34

0,473

100,20

413,199

Table 1 presents the main characteristics of the sample. As can be noted, the number of
people engaged in prosocial activities is relevant. A great majority of the respondents
(77%) has made on average 2,84 donations in the last three years and the highest amount
donated is on average 100 Euros. However, as expected, a small number of respondents
(4%) have donated to cultural organizations. Further, 34% of the sample belongs to a
voluntary organization. Further, respondents consider the conservation of cultural
heritage a relevant issue. This result may be partly explained by the fact that the
respondents are interested in cultural heritage having been chosen among those who
visited a cultural site at least once in the past year. For instance, the average number of
visits to museums is about three times a year.

5. Results
Intrinsic motivations and contributions to cultural heritage
The 32,7% of the respondents, 327 out of 1000 individuals, was willing to donate for a
leading Italian museum or heritage site located in the region of residence. The average

9
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donation is € 70,81 with a median of € 30, a minimum of € 1 and a maximum of € 20005.
This result comes out from the basic scenario in which individuals are supposed to
behave following exclusively intrinsic motivations, that is without any explicit form of
incentives or other potential benefits.
A first glimpse at the distribution of the amounts donated (Figure 2) shows two peaks,
respectively around 10-20 € and 50-100 €. This suggests the existence of two main
classes of contributors. The former is characterized by small amounts, typical of those
who spontaneously give in donation boxes at the entrance to museums when either or not
an entrance fee is charged. Its main trait is likely to correspond to the use value for the
consumer. The latter class is more likely to patronage behaviour aimed to the realization
of passive use values of cultural heritage: existence, option, and intergenerational value.
Figure 2 – Percentage of donors per amount of donation

Further, Table 2 presents the number of contributors and the amount declared according
to the main socio-demographic characteristics of the sample. Women are more likely to
contribute than men and donate a greater amount. Occupied respondents have a higher
propensity to donate and contribute a larger amount of money than unoccupied
individuals. As for the age of donors, data show that young people are more willing to
donate to cultural heritage. Nevertheless, the average amount increases with the age of
donors. Similarly, there are relatively more donors from the South of Italy, but the
amount per donor is sensibly less than that donated by contributors from North and
Centre Italy. Educational level of donors positively affects both the propensity to
contribute and the amount of donation.

5

Troughout the analysis and the in econometric estimates we use only the upper bound of the
monetary interval stated by the respondents.
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Table 2 – Donations according to main socio-demographic variables
Donors

% of
sample
group

Mean

Male

126

29,23%

63,37

94,71

Female

201

35,33%

75,47

200,85

Region
North
Centre
South

138
59
130

29,74%
29,50%
38,69%

78,2
77,14
60,08

200,843
155,17
132,17

Job
Unoccupied
Occupied

124
203

29,59%
34,94%

64,17
74,86

114,689
193,64

Age
25-44
45-64
65+

126
146
55

40,78%
29,80%
27,36%

53,5
68,71
116,02

125,53
136,21
285,13

Education
Low School
Undergraduated
Graduated

34
141
152

25,00%
29,50%
39,38%

27,74
63,8
86,94

28,39
146,05
200,64

Total Sample

327

100%

70,81

168

S.D

Sex

Within the group of donors, additional questions in the survey reveal that anounymous
mechanisms6 of donations account for 61% of donors. One explanation for this evidence
may be that the majority of pure prosocial donors prefer not to reveal their identity.
Another possibility is that the choice of anonymous mechanisms of donation is related to
smaller amounts of contribution. In our case, while we cannot test the first hyphotesis, for
the latter the correlation between the amount donated and the mechanism of publicity is
positive (ρ = 0,241) and significant at 0,01% level.
Further, it can be noted that 78% of the donors’ sample is motivated by passive use
values of cultural heritage (existence, intergenerational and option values), 17% is
motivated by use-value reasons (i.e. improving the quality of visitors’ services, acquiring
new artworks), while only a small fraction (1%) expressely justify its contribution with
the “joy of giving”. These results confirm that the main intrinsic motivational drivers are
not directly connected with the direct use of cultural good, but with preferences for the
public good characteristics of cultural heritage.

6

For anonymous mechanisms of donations we adopt the criterium of traceability of
donors’ contribution. Anonimous mechanisms we proposed are: 1) in a donation box and
2) through sms messages. Non anonymous methods we proposed are 1) bank and postal
transfers and 2) membership and patronage schemes.
11
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As for the non-donors, we explore the motivation of their refusal. The majority (47%) of
those not willing to contribute to cultural heritage declare they have priorities for
contributions in other charitable sectors and 25 % state that it is unfair to contribute
beyond the public support.
In order to better analyse the determinants of donations due to individuals’ intrinsic
motivations we run a 2 steps model (Heckman, 1979) where we test the significance of
the main characteristics of the respondents. This involves estimating a probit model of the
form

(1)

Gi = βZ i + ui

€

in the first step, where Gi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent makes a
donation and 0 otherwise. In the second step the regression

(2)

(Amount | Gi > 0) = γX i + θλi + ei

€

is estimated using a two-stage least squares, where γ is a vector of coefficients, θ is a
scalar coefficient and λi is the Heckman correction term (inverse Mills ratio) required for
consistent estimation. As for the explanatory variables, the same socio-demographic
variables have been used in both stages to test the propensity to donate and the amount
contributed. However, taking into account past experience of donations we expect that
the dummies PastDonation and DonCulture are more likely to affect only the decision to
donate at all, while the highest stated amount donated in the past (ValuePastDon) is
expected to affect the second stage of the model.
The econometric estimates (Table 3) confirm the expected results on donors’ behavior
based on intrinsic motivations. First, individual education increases the probability to
donate and the amount contributed. Educational level is indeed usually considered as a
proxy variable for cultural consumption, which in turn determines a greater consideration
for culture and cultural heritage. Second, past experiences of giving - and especially
donation to culture and arts organizations - matter in determining the willingness to
donate. However, the level of past contributions seems to not affect the amount donated.
Third, the greater is the importance given by respondents to the conservation of cultural
heritage the higher is the probability to donate and the larger is amount contributed.

12
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Table 3 – 2 Steps Heckman model
Parameter Estimates
Sample size
N=1000

N=327

Variables

Step 1

Step 2

Dependent
Variable

Willingness to donate
Yes=1 No=0

Amount
contributed

Constant
Age
Sex
North
Centre
Job
Education
DonCulture
PastDonations
Importance
Voluntary Organization
Visits

-1,804***
(-4,26)
-0,211**
(-3,13)
-0,080
(-0,91)
-0,204**
(-2,13)
-0,216*
(-1,80)
-0,045
(-0,46)
0,032**
(2,27)
0,545**
(2,73)
0,398**
(3,69)
0,376**
(2,86)
-0,077
(-0,85)
-0,33
(1,18)

ValuePastDon
Inverse Mills
Ratio

Log Likelihood
McFadden Pseudo R2
Adjusted R-squared
Chi-squared

-559,77**
(-3,03)
4,91
(0,26)
-30,68
(-1,31)
-15,231
(-0,57)
-18,105
(-0.54)
19,302
(0,80)
8,78**
(2,27)
88,87**
(2,07)
8,435
(0,25)
0,02
(1,46)
206,47**
(2,76)

-597,17
0,055
69,72

-2120,4
0,0047
37,18

t-ratios in parentheses
* significant at α=0,10
** significant fat α=0,05
*** significant at α=0,01
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The role of extrinsic and reputational motivations
The second step of the analysis deals with the additional effect of extrinsic and
reputational incentives on the donation choice expressed by the individuals. In order to
have a comprehensive and simultaneous understanding of the characteristics of the
respondents and to understand how the individuals are attracted by different incentives,
we identified a variable representing the most significant choice of donation for each
individual among the different scenarios, namely pure prosocial behavior, fiscal incentive
(tax rebates 19%) and reputational mechanism. In other words, when the individual
willingness to donate is positive for two or more scenarios, the highest willingness to
donate will be taken as representative of the best choice. Consequently, the respondent
can be classified according to the following choices: being a non-donor, a pure prosocial
donor (reacting just to intrinsic motivations) and a donor reacting either to reputational
incentives or monetary compensation (tax rabates 19%). Table 4 illustrates the
descriptive statistics of the four options.
Table 4 – Donors’ behavior according to the best choice variable
CHOICE
Pure Prosocial
Reputational
Incentives
Fiscal Incentives
19%
No Donation

Mean
(€)

Total donors

Initial non-donors

Total
Amount
Donated
(€)

71,96

260

0/260

18.709

330,03

36

10/36

11.880

68,89

92

51/92

6.338

0

612

612/612

0

One of the most evident results is that 260 individuals are pure prosocial donors and their
average donation is 71,96 €. This means that about 80% (260 out of 327) of those who
were initially willing to contribute has not accepted to change his amount according to
new incentives.
Only 92 respondents have chosen monetary compensation as the most significative
choice in terms of amount donated, while those who reacted most to reputational
incentives are just 36. The intronduction of new incentives (fiscal rebate at 19% and
reputational mechanisms) attracts as well contributors from those initially stating their
non-willingess to donate. In general, the amount of new contributors generated by
monetary and reputational incentives is respectively 8,2% and 1,5% of the initial nondonors.
Looking at the average amount donated by the different classes of donors two
considerations are at stake. First, the donors responding to reputational incentives
contribute the highest amount, equal to an average of 330,03 €. Second, the average
donation by those reacting most to monetary compensation is the lowest one and in
particular below the average amount donated by the pure prosocial group. Arguably, this
latter result is due to the fact that a large number of donors reacting most to the tax rebate
were initial non-donors and their willingness to donate stimulated by the fiscal incentive
is still lower than that of pure prosocial donors.
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New Contexts
After the analysis of the standard incentives to donate we consider two additional
scenarios to better understand the role of fiscal incentives and accountability affecting the
willingness to donate.
Table 5 – Donors behavior according to the best choice variable with new contexts

473

% Initial Non
Donors in the
group
100%

Total Amount
Donated
(€)
0

68,12

32

56,25%

2.180

146,4

166

36,75%

24.302

542,62

16

31,25%

8.682

123,48

191

60,73%

23.585

60,16

122

0,00%

7.340

CHOICE

Mean

Total Donors

No Donation
Fiscal
Incentives 19%
Fiscal
Incentives 50%
Reputational
Incentives
Transparency/
Accountability
Pure Prosocial

0

Table 5 shows how the patterns of donors’ behavior change according to the old and new
proposed scenarios.
Adding two new conditions has many effects on the structure of donors’ choices. The two
added scenarios are clearly appealing, collecting 166 preferences for fiscal incentives at
50% and 191 preferences for more transparency and accountability.
As a consequence, the number of initial non-donors decreases from 627 to 473. At the
same time, almost half of pure prosocial donors have moved to the new scenarios,
attracted by the new favourable conditions. In any case, pure prosocial donors still
represent a good share of the total donors: they are 122 and the average amount they
stated to donate is 60,16 €
Moreover, considering monetary compensation, fiscal incentives at 19% are not any more
attractive. The new fiscal scheme at 50% accounts for 83% of all those respondents who
express fiscal incentive as the best choice for donation. Reputational incentives confirm
their elitarian profile with a small group of 16 people but with the highest average of
contribution (542,62€). The condition for transparency and accountability provides the
most interesting result, especially for the Italian case where the citizens’ trust on
institutions is generally low (Eurobarometer, 2009). Crucially, 191 individuals have
chosen this possibility with an average donation of 123,48€. Transparency and
accountability conditions are also the main attractors of initial non-donors as compared to
other scenarios. Crucially, we suggest interpreting this result as a form of crowding-in of
latent pro-social donors. Transparency and accountability conditions do not expressely
represent an incentive for giving, such as fiscal or reputational mechanisms, but can
nevertheless increase the return of pro-social actions by donors moved by intrinsic
motivations. In this context, the lack of transparency and accountability of recipient
institutions represent an additional cost for pure prosocial donors.
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6. Conclusion and policy implications
This paper explored three main issues. The first was whether or not there is room for
donations to cultural heritage moved simply by intrinsic motivations and what are the
main socio-economic determinants of such pure prosocial behavior. The second issue was
the role of extrinsic and reputational incentives in enhancing contribution to cultural
heritage. Finally, the third issue aimed to provide some insights in new contexts and
conditions that can affect donors’ behavior, namely the level of monetary compensation
and the issue of accountability of the recipient institution.
The main empirical results of the survey reveal the strategic role of intrinsic motivations
as the principal determinants of the choice to giving. Taking into account the contexts of
choice, the accountability undoubtedly appears to be the key circumstance fitting with the
greater mobilization of latent donors and is able to enhance giving for culture in Italy.
Furthermore the results show some significant suggestions for the contemporary policy
making. The current political debate concerning private donations to culture and cultural
heritage has mainly focused on fiscal incentives. This research however suggests decision
makers should count on a more elaborate and comprehensive framework of incentives.
First, in order to strengthen intrinsic motivations (civicness, universal value of cultural
heritage, ethic motivations) medium and long-term policies are at stake. Such policies
should be mainly directed to the educational system, the enhancement of cultural
consumption habits and to collective events like “Telethon” or awareness campaigns,
which increase the attention to cultural heritage preservation. Similarly, new strategies
should be developed to enhance the accountability of recipient institutions in order to
increase the confidence of pro-social donors.
Second, because patronage behavior refers to small group of donors but can still play a
relevant role in funding cultural heritage, new niche policies can be proposed to foster
publicity mechanisms of great donors. This is particularly relevant in Italy where there is
generally lack of these mechanisms for individual donors.
Finally, standard fiscal policies do not seem very effective in enhancing donations, unless
trough an exceptional increase of the tax rebate. This points out the necessity for policymakers to find appropriate and minimal tax rebate levels which maximize the number of
people willing to contribute or to increase their donation above that given trough intrinsic
motivation. However, increasing too much fiscal incentives seems hard to be realized
mainly because of the high costs in foregone taxes and because of the immoderate
importance that would be given to private donations for the support of cultural heritage
institutions.
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